Faulty Communication

Stephen Morris

No 1271R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet publicly but not as a plenary group, and may be robust to strategic decisions about whether to communicate.

Keywords: Electronic mail; common knowledge; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2000-08, Revised 2001-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: CFP 1126
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Published in Advances in Theoretical Economics (2001), 1(1): 1-23

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