Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
Stephen Morris () and
Hyun Song Shin
No 1273, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets? To address this issue, we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals. Even abstracting from signalling, the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling. Relative to the case in which there is no large investors, small investors attack the currency when fundamentals are stronger. Yet, the difference can be small, or null, depending on the relative precision of private information of the small and large investors. Adding signalling makes the influence of the large trader on small traders' behaviour much stronger.
Keywords: Currency attack; unique equilibrium; speculation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 F31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Note: CFP 1088.
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Published in Review of Economic Studies (2004), 71(1): 87-113
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Journal Article: Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders (2004)
Working Paper: Does one Soros make a difference? A theory of currency crises with large and small traders (2001)
Working Paper: Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders (2001)
Working Paper: Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders (2000)
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