Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information

Dino Gerardi

No 1371, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: In this paper we study the effects of adding unmediated communication to static, finite games of complete and incomplete information. We characterize S^{U}(G), the set of outcomes of a game G, that are induced by sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions. A cheap talk extension of G is an extensive-form game in which players communicate before playing G. A reliable mediator is not available and players exchange private or public messages that do not affect directly their payoffs. We first show that if G is a game of complete information with five or more players and rational parameters, then S^{U}(G) coincides with the set of correlated equilibria of G. Next, we demonstrate that if G is a game of incomplete information with at least five players, rational parameters and full support (i.e. all profiles of types have positive probability), then S^{U}(G) is equal to the set of communication equilibria of G.

Keywords: Communication; Correlated equilibrium; Communication equilibrium; Sequential equilibrium; Mechanism design; Revelation principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 73 pages
Date: 2002-05
Note: CFP 1083.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (2004), 114" 104-131

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