Best Response Equivalence

Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui

No 1377, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provide a characterization of when two games are best-response equivalent. The characterizations exploit a dual relationship between payoff differences and beliefs. Some "potential game" arguments (cf. Monderer and Shapley, 1996, Games. Econ. Behav. 14, 124-143) rely only on the property that potential games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games. Our results show that a large class of games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games, but are not potential games. Thus we show how some existing potential game arguments can be extended.

Keywords: Best response equivalence; Duality; Farkas' Lemma; Potential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2002-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (2004), 49: 260-287

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