Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on Electronic Mail Game

Stephen Morris

No 1401, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Common knowledge plays an important role in coordination problems and coordination problems are central to many areas of economic policy. In this paper, I review some common knowledge puzzles culminating in the electronic mail game. These puzzles may seem distant from practical concerns. However, I then argue why insights derived from this literature are useful in interpreting empirical evidence of how people coordinate under uncertainty and in understanding the role of communication in coordinating behaviour.

Keywords: Common knowledge; Coordination; Communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2003-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-gth and nep-ind
Note: CFP 1060.
References: Add references at CitEc
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Published in Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 18(4), 2002

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Related works:
Working Paper: Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic Mail Game (2004)
Journal Article: Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-mail Game (2002)
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