Dynamic Price Competition

Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki

No 1412, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We consider the model of price competition for a single buyer among many sellers in a dynamic environment. The surplus from each trade is allowed to depend on the path of previous purchases, and as a result, the model captures phenomena such as learning by doing and habit formation in consumption characterize Markovian equilibria for finite and infinite horizon versions of the model and show that the stationary infinite horizon version of the model possesses an equilibrium where all the sellers receive an equilibrium payoff equal to their marginal contribution to the social welfare.

Keywords: Dynamic competition; Marginal contribution; Markov perfect equilibrium; Common agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2003-04
Note: CFP 1174
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory (2006), 127: 232-263

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Journal Article: Dynamic price competition (2006)
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