Robust Mechanism Design

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

No 1421R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying implementation on richer type spaces. We ask when ex post implementation is equivalent to interim (or Bayesian) implementation for all possible type spaces. The equivalence holds in the case of separable environments; examples of separable environments arise (1) when the planner is implementing a social choice function (not correspondence); and (2) in a quasilinear environment with no restrictions on transfers. The equivalence fails in general, including in some quasilinear environments with budget balance. In private value environments, ex post implementation is equivalent to dominant strategies implementation. The private value versions of our results offer new insights into the relation between dominant strategy implementation and Bayesian implementation.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Common knowledge; Universal type space; Interim equilibrium; Ex-post equilibrium; Dominant strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 C82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2003-05, Revised 2004-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in Econometrica (2005), 73(6): 1771-1813

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Related works:
Chapter: Robust Mechanism Design (2012)
Journal Article: Robust Mechanism Design (2005)
Working Paper: Robust Mechanism Design (2005)
Working Paper: Robust Mechanism Design (2004)
Working Paper: Robust Mechanism Design (2003)
Working Paper: Robust Mechanism Design (2003)
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