The Edgeworth, Cournot and Walrasian Cores of an Economy

Martin Shubik

No 1439, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.

Keywords: Market games; Strategic market game; Exchange economy; Core; Characteristic function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2003-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1439

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