A Double Auction Market: Teaching, Experiment and Theory

Martin Shubik

No 1443, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: A simultaneous double auction market with bid and offer cards was utilized in classes on the theory and history of money and financial institutions and occasionally in classes on the theory of games. The prime purpose in using this game was to teach the students how to construct process models of economic phenomena. The second purpose was to consider the properties of the double auction market. The third purpose was to interpret the experimental results an link them to theory.

Keywords: Double auctions; Experimental games; Allocation games; Noncooperative equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C92 D44 G1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2003-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-ind and nep-mic
Note: CFP 1147.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Simulation and Gaming (June 2005), 36(2): 166-182

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Journal Article: A double auction market: Teaching, experiment, and theory (2005)
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