Absenteeism, Substitutes, and Complements in Simple Games

Thomas Quint and Martin Shubik
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Thomas Quint: University of Nevada, Reno

No 1447, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: A voting with absenteeism game is defined as a pair (G;r) where G is an n-player (monotonic) simple game and r is an n-vector for which r_i is the probability that player i attends a vote. We define a power index for such games, called the absentee index. We axiomatize the absentee index and provide a multilinear extension formula for it. Using this analysis we re-derive Myerson's (1977, 1980) ibalanced contributionsi property for the Shapley-Shubik power index. In fact, we derive a formula which quantitatively gives the amount of the ibalanced contributionsi in terms of the coefficients of the multilinear extension of the game. Finally, we define the notion of substitutes and complements in simple games. We compare these concepts with the familiar concepts of dummy player, veto player, and master player.

Keywords: Simple game; Shapley-Shubik power index; Absenteeism; Multilinear extension; Balanced contributions; Substitute; Complement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2003-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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