Randomized Sign Test for Dependent Observations on Discrete Choice under Risk
Jeremy Gray (),
Boaz Nadler (),
Glena Ames () and
Donald Brown ()
Additional contact information
Jeremy Gray: Dept. of Psychology, Yale University
Boaz Nadler: Dept. of Mathematics, Yale University
Glena Ames: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, http://cowles.yale.edu/
No 1526, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
This paper proposes nonparametric statistical procedures for analyzing discrete choice models of affective decision making. We make two contributions to the literature on behavioral economics. Namely, we propose a procedure for eliciting the existence of a Nash equilibrium in an intrapersonal, potential game as well as randomized sign tests for dependent observations on game-theoretic models of affective decision making. This methodology is illustrated in the context of a hypothetical experiment -- the Casino Game.
Keywords: Behavioral economics; Affective decision making; Intrapersonal potential games; Randomized sign tests; Dependent observations; Adapted sequences; Martingale-difference sequences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 C32 C35 C72 C91 D11 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-ecm, nep-exp and nep-fmk
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1526
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matthew Regan ().