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Empirical Models of Auctions

Susan Athey () and Philip Haile

No 1562, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Many important economic questions arising in auctions can be answered only with knowledge of the underlying primitive distributions governing bidder demand and information. An active literature has developed aiming to estimate these primitives by exploiting restrictions from economic theory as part of the econometric model used to interpret auction data. We review some highlights of this recent literature, focusing on identification and empirical applications. We describe three insights that underlie much of the recent methodological progress in this area and discuss some of the ways these insights have been extended to richer models allowing more convincing empirical applications. We discuss several recent empirical studies using these methods to address a range of important economic questions.

Keywords: Auctions; Identification; Estimation; Testing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C5 L1 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ecm
Date: 2006-03
Note: CFP 1229.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in Richard Blundell, Whitney Newey, and Torsten Persson, eds., Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Theory and Applications: Ninth World Congress, Vol. II, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 1-45

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