Games of Connectivity

Pradeep Dubey and Rahul Garg
Additional contact information
Rahul Garg: IBM India Research Lab, New Delhi

No 1592, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We consider a communications network in which users transmit beneficial information to each other at a cost. We pinpoint conditions under which the induced cooperative game is supermodular (convex). Our analysis is in a lattice-theoretic framework, which is at once simple and able to encompass a wide variety of seemingly disparate models.

Keywords: Information lattice; Multicast/unicast transmission; Cooperative games; Shapley value; Convex/supermodular games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D82 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2006-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ict and nep-net
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Working Paper: Games of Connectivity (2006)
Working Paper: Games of Connectivity (2006)
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