Three Minimal Market Institutions with Human and Algorithmic Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik and Shyam Sunder
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Juergen Huber: University of Innsbruck

No 1623R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We define and examine three minimal market games (sell-all, buy-sell, and double auction) in the laboratory relative to the predictions of theory. These closed exchange economies have some cash to facilitate transactions, and include feedback. The experiment reveals that (1) the competitive general equilibrium (CGE) and non-cooperative (NCE) models are reasonable anchors to locate most but not all the observed outcomes of the three market mechanisms; (2) outcomes tend to get closer to CGE predictions as the number of players increases; (3) prices and allocations in double auctions deviate persistently from CGE predictions; (4) the outcome paths across the three market mechanisms differ significantly and persistently; (5) importance of market structures for outcomes is reinforced by algorithmic trader simulations; and (6) none of the three markets dominates the others across six measures of performance. Inclusion of some mechanism differences into theory may enhance our understanding of important aspects of markets.

Keywords: Strategic market games; Laboratory experiments; Minimally intelligent agents; Adaptive learning agents; General equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D43 D51 D58 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2007-08, Revised 2010-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (2010), 70: 403-424

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Related works:
Journal Article: Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: Theory and experimental evidence (2010)
Working Paper: Three Minimal Market Institutions with Human and Algorithmic Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence (2009)
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