Financial Control of a Competitive Economy without Randomness
Martin Shubik and
William D. Sudderth
Additional contact information
Ioannis Karatzas: Columbia University
William D. Sudderth: University of Minnesota
No 1681, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
The monetary and fiscal control of a simple economy without outside randomness is studied here from the micro-economic basis of a strategic market game. The government's bureaucracy is treated as a public good that provides services at a cost. A conventional public good is also considered.
Keywords: Dynamic programming; Public goods; Bureaucracy; Taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D53 H23 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-pbe
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Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory (August 2011), 13(4): 503-537
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1681
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