Alessandro Bonatti () and
No 1695, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in an uncertain project, and their individual efforts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. The collaboration dwindles over time, but never ceases as long as the project has not succeeded. In fact, the delay until the project succeeds, if it ever does, increases with the number of agents. We show why deadlines, but not necessarily better monitoring, help to mitigate moral hazard.
Keywords: Moral hazard; Teams; Experimentation; Collaboration; Public goods; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 102 pages
Date: 2009-04, Revised 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-pbe, nep-ppm and nep-soc
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Published in American Economic Review (April 2011), 101(2): 632-663
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Journal Article: Collaborating (2011)
Working Paper: Collaborating (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1695
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