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Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments

Chen-Zhong Qin, Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik
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Chen-Zhong Qin: Dept. of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara

No 1729, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: A link between a no-side-payment (NSP) market game and a side-payment (SP) market game can be established by introducing a sufficient amount of an ideal utility-money of constant marginal utility to all agents. At some point when there is "enough money" in the system, if it is "well distributed" the new game will be a SP game. This game can also be related to a pure NSP game where a set of default parameters have been introduced. These parameters play a role similar to the parameters specifying the interpersonal comparisons in the side-payment game. We study this game for the properties of the delta-core and consider both the conditions for the uniqueness of competitive equilibria and a new approach to the second welfare theorem. A discussion of the relationship between market games and strategic market games is also noted.

Keywords: delta-core; enough money; market games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D51 E4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2009-09
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