Default Penalty as a Selection Mechanism among Multiple Equilibria

Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik and Shyam Sunder
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Juergen Huber: University of Innsbruck

No 1730R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Closed exchange and production-and-exchange economies may have multiple equilibria, a fact that is usually ignored in macroeconomic models. Our basic argument is that default and bankruptcy laws are required to prevent strategic default, and these laws can also serve to provide the conditions for uniqueness. In this paper, we report experimental evidence on the effectiveness of this approach to resolving multiplicity: a society can assign default penalties on fiat money so that the economy selects one of the equilibria. Our data show that the choice of default penalty takes the economy close to the chosen equilibrium. The theory and evidence together reinforce the idea that accounting, bankruptcy and possibly other aspects of social mechanisms play an important role in resolving the otherwise mathematically intractable challenges associated with multiplicity of equilibria in closed economies.

Keywords: Bankruptcy penalty; Financial institutions; Fiat money; Multiple equilibria; Experimental gaming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C92 D51 E42 G21 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2009-10, Revised 2012-12
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Related works:
Journal Article: Default penalty as a selection mechanism among multiple equilibria (2016)
Working Paper: Default Penalty as a Selection Mechanism among Multiple Equilibria (2014)
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