Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

Dirk Bergemann and Maher Said

No 1757R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms.

Keywords: Dynamic auctions and mechanisms; Random arrivals and departures; Changing private information; Incentive compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D43 D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2010-03, Revised 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
Note: CFP 1325
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in J.J. Cochran, L.A. Cox, P. Keskinocak, J.P. Kharoufeh, and J.C. Smith, eds. Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 2, Wiley, 2011, pp. 1511-1522

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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic Auctions: A Survey (2010)
Working Paper: Dynamic Auctions: A Survey (2010)
Working Paper: Dynamic Auctions: A Survey (2010)
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