Efficient Search by Committee

Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki

No 1782, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard utilitarian welfare criterion. Furthermore, the mechanism can be modified to have a balanced budget.

Keywords: Search; Committtees; Voting; Mechanism design; Dynamic pivot mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D82 D83 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2011-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-cta
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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