Health Reform, Health Insurance, and Selection: Estimating Selection into Health Insurance Using the Massachusetts Health Reform

Martin Hackmann, Jonathan T. Kolstad and Amanda Kowalski
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Jonathan T. Kolstad: Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

No 1841, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We implement an empirical test for selection into health insurance using changes in coverage induced by the introduction of mandated health insurance in Massachusetts. Our test examines changes in the cost of the newly insured relative to those who were insured prior to the reform. We find that counties with larger increases in insurance coverage over the reform period face the smallest increase in average hospital costs for the insured population, consistent with adverse selection into insurance before the reform. Additional results, incorporating cross-state variation and data on health measures, provide further evidence for adverse selection.

Keywords: Adverse selection; Massachusetts; Health reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H51 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ias
Note: CFP 1361
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published in American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings (May 2012), 102(3): 498-501

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Journal Article: Health Reform, Health Insurance, and Selection: Estimating Selection into Health Insurance Using the Massachusetts Health Reform (2012)
Working Paper: Health Reform, Health Insurance, and Selection: Estimating Selection into Health Insurance Using the Massachusetts Health Reform (2012)
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