Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types

Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi

No 1846, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modelling interdependent preferences distinguishing between "payoff types" and "belief types" and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation can be partially Bayesian implemented on a finite type space. The characterization can be used to unify a number of sufficient conditions for efficient partial implementation in this classical auction setting. We report how a canonical language for discussing interdependent types -- developed in a more general setting by Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011) -- applies in this setting and note by example that this canonical language will not allow us to distinguish some types in the payoff type -- belief type language.

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Robust mechanism design; Efficient auctions; Interdepedent types; Partial implementation; Full implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: CFP 1360
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings (May 2012), 102(3): 319-324

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Working Paper: Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types (2012)
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