Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers

Sebastian Kranz

No 1847, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper studies discounted stochastic games perfect or imperfect public monitoring and the opportunity to conduct voluntary monetary transfers. We show that for all discount factors every public perfect equilibrium payoff can be implemented with a simple class of equilibria that have a stationary structure on the equilibrium path and optimal penal codes with a stick and carrot structure. We develop algorithms that exactly compute or approximate the set of equilibrium payoffs and find simple equilibria that implement these payoffs.

Keywords: Stochastic games; Monetary transfers; Computation; Imperfect public monitoring; Public perfect equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C63 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Related works:
Journal Article: Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers (2018)
Working Paper: Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers (2012)
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