Matching with Incomplete Information

Quingmin Liu, George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson ()
Additional contact information
Quingmin Liu: Dept. of Economics, Columbia University
Larry Samuelson: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/faculty/larry-samuelson

No 1870, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically assumes that the agents have complete information, and examines core outcomes. We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make from the hypothesis that the current allocation is stable. We show that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty in incomplete information environments, and is a superset of the set of complete-information stable outcomes. We provide sufficient conditions for incomplete-information stable matchings to be efficient.

Keywords: Matching; Stability; Stable outcome; Incomplete information; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D5 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2012-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Matching with Incomplete Information (2012)
Working Paper: Matching with Incomplete Information (2012)
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