The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs
Yi-Chun Chen (),
Alfredo Di Tillio (),
Eduardo Faingold () and
Siyang Xiong ()
Additional contact information
Eduardo Faingold: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/eduardo-faingold
No 1875, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Previous research has established that the predictions made by game theory about strategic behavior in incomplete information games are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by characterizing conditions on the primitives of the model -- the players’ hierarchies of beliefs -- for the strategic behavior of a given Harsanyi type to be approximated by the strategic behavior of (a sequence of) perturbed types. This amounts to providing characterizations of the strategic topologies of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) in terms of beliefs. We apply our characterizations to a variety of questions concerning robustness to perturbations of higher-order beliefs, including genericity of common priors, and the connections between robustness of strategic behavior and the notion of common p-belief of Monderer and Samet (1989).
Keywords: Games with incomplete information; Rationalizability; Higher-order beliefs; Robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1875
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matthew Regan ().