The Evolution of 'Theory of Mind': Theory and Experiments

Erik Kimbrough, Nikolaus Robalino and Arthur Robson

No 1908, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper provides an evolutionary foundation for our capacity to attribute preferences to others. This ability is intrinsic to game theory, and is a key component of "Theory of Mind", perhaps the capstone of social cognition. We argue here that this component of theory of mind allows organisms to efficiently modify their behavior in strategic environments with a persistent element of novelty. Such environments are represented here by multistage games of perfect information with randomly chosen outcomes. "Theory of Mind" then yields a sharp, unambiguous advantage over less sophisticated, behavioral approaches to strategic interaction. In related experiments, we show the subscale for social skills in standard tests for autism is a highly significant determinant of the speed of learning in such games.

Keywords: Evolution; Theory of mind (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2013-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-neu
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Evolution of 'Theory of Mind': Theory and Experiments (2014)
Working Paper: The Evolution of 'Theory of Mind': Theory and Experiments (2013)
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