Money and Status: How Best to Incentivize Work
Pradeep Dubey and
John Geanakoplos ()
Additional contact information
John Geanakoplos: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, http://economics.yale.edu/people/john-geanakoplos
No 1954R2, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Status is greatly valued in the real world, yet it has not received much attention from economic theorists. We examine how the owner of a firm can best combine money and status to get her employees to work hard for the least total cost. We find that she should motivate workers of low skill mostly by status and high skill mostly by money. Moreover, she should do so by using a small number of titles and wage levels. This often results in star wages to the elite performers and, more generally, in wage jumps for small increases in productivity. By analogy, the governance of a society should pay special attention to the status concerns of ordinary citizens, which may often be accomplished by reinforcing suitable social norms.
Keywords: Status; Incentives; Wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 I20 I30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-hrm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Money and Status: How Best to Incentivize Work (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1954r2
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matthew Regan ().