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Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

No 1973, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We discuss four solution concepts for games with incomplete information. We show how each solution concept can be viewed as encoding informational robustness. For a given type space, we consider expansions of the type space that provide players with additional signals. We distinguish between expansions along two dimensions. First, the signals can either convey payoff relevant information or only payoff irrelevant information. Second, the signals can be generated from a common (prior) distribution or not. We establish the equivalence between Bayes Nash equilibrium behavior under the resulting expansion of the type space and a corresponding more permissive solution concept under the original type space. This approach unifies some existing literature and, in the case of an expansion without a common prior and allowing for payoff relevant signals, leads us to a new solution concept that we dub belief-free rationalizability.

Keywords: Incomplete information; Informational robustness; Bayes correlated equilibrium; Interim corrrelated rationalizability; Belief free rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
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