Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations

Joyee Deb (), Jin Li and Arijit Mukherjee
Additional contact information
Joyee Deb: School of Management, Yale University, https://sites.google.com/site/joyeedeb/
Jin Li: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Arijit Mukherjee: Dept. of Economics, Michigan State University

No 1995, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We study optimal contracting in a setting where a firm repeatedly interacts with multiple workers, and can compensate them based on publicly available performance signals as well as privately reported peer evaluations. If the evaluation and the effort provision are done by different workers (as in a supervisor/agent hierarchy), we show that, using both the private and public signals, the first best can be achieved even in a static setting. However, if each worker is required to both exert effort and report on his co-worker�s performance (as in a team setting), the worker�s effort incentives cannot be decoupled from his truth-telling incentives. This makes the optimal static contract inefficient and relational contracts based on the public signals increase efficiency. In the optimal contract, it may be optimal to ignore signals that are informative of the worker�s effort.

Keywords: Relational contracts; Subjective evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-mic and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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