Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

No 2027, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an "information designer" who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We describe a unifying perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We extend information design to many players and relate it to the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium.

Keywords: Information design; Bayesian persuasion; Bayes correlated equilibrium; Information structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (60)

Published in American Economic Review (May 2016), 106(5): 586-91

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Journal Article: Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (2016)
Working Paper: Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion And Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (2016)
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