The Design and Price of Information

Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti and Alex Smolin

No 2049, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper analyzes the trade of information between a data buyer and a data seller. The data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty and seeks to augment his initial private information with supplemental data. The data seller is uncertain about the willingness-to-pay of the data buyer due to this private information. The data seller optimally offers a menu of (Blackwell) experiments as statistical tests to the data buyer. The seller exploits differences in the beliefs of the buyer�s types to reduce information rents while limiting the surplus that must be sacrificed to provide incentives.

Keywords: selling information; experiments; mechanism design; price discrimination; product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2016-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Design and Price of Information (2018)
Working Paper: The Design and Price of Information (2017)
Working Paper: The Design and Price of Information (2016)
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