EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Dirk Bergemann () and Stephen Morris ()

No 2075, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.

Keywords: Information design; Bayesian persuasion; correlated equilibrium; incomplete information; robust predictions; information structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2017-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2075.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2017) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2075

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matthew Regan ().

 
Page updated 2019-09-14
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2075