Aiming for the Goal: Contribution Dynamics of Crowdfunding
Joyee Deb (),
Aniko Oery () and
Kevin R. Williams ()
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Joyee Deb: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, http://som.yale.edu/joyee-deb
Aniko Oery: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, http://som.yale.edu/aniko-oery
Kevin R. Williams: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, http://som.yale.edu/kevin-r-williams
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Aniko Öry
No 2149, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
We study reward-based crowdfunding campaigns, a new class of dynamic contribution games where consumption is exclusive. Two types of backers participate: buyers want to consume the product while donors just want the campaign to succeed. The key tension is one of coordination between buyers, instead of free-riding. Donors can alleviate this coordination risk. We analyze a dynamic model of crowdfunding and demonstrate that its predictions are consistent with high-frequency data collected from Kickstarter. We compare the Kickstarter mechanism to alternative platform designs and evaluate the value of dynamically arriving information. We extend the model to incorporate social learning about quality.
Keywords: Crowdfunding; Contribution Games; Dynamic Models; Kickstarter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 L26 M13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 63 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pay
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Working Paper: Aiming for the Goal: Contribution Dynamics of Crowdfunding (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2149
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