Aiming for the Goal: Contribution Dynamics of Crowdfunding

Joyee Deb (), Aniko Oery () and Kevin R. Williams ()
Additional contact information
Joyee Deb: Cowles Foundation, Yale University
Aniko Oery: Cowles Foundation, Yale University
Kevin R. Williams: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://cowles.yale.edu/people/kevin-williams

No 2149R2, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Fundraising campaigns draw support from a wide pool of contributors. Some contributors are interested in private rewards offered in exchange for contributions (buyers), whereas others are publicly-minded and value success (donors). Buyers face a coordination problem because of the positive externalities of campaign success. A leadership donor who strategically times contributions can promote coordination by dynamically signaling his valuation. The ability to signal increases the probability of success and benefits all participants relative to the donor valuation being known. We validate our modeling assumptions and theoretical predictions using Kickstarter data.

Keywords: Crowdfunding; Contribution Games; Dynamic Models; Kickstarter; Leadership Donor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 L26 M13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 97 pages
Date: 2018-12, Revised 2023-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2023-03/D2149R2.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2149r2

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().