Optimal Control of an Epidemic through Social Distancing

Thomas Kruse and Philipp Strack ()
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Thomas Kruse: Giessen University

No 2229, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We analyze how to optimally engage in social distancing (SD) in order to minimize the spread of an infectious disease. We identify conditions under which the optimal policy is single-peaked, i.e., first engages in increasingly more social distancing and subsequently decreases its intensity. We show that the optimal policy might delay measures that decrease the transmission rate substantially to create "herd-immunity" and that engaging in social distancing sub-optimally early can increase the number of fatalities. Finally, we find that optimal social distancing can be an effective measure in substantially reducing the death rate of a disease.

Keywords: Social Distancing; SIR model; Time-Optimal Control of an Epidemic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2020-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pay
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Working Paper: Optimal Control of an Epidemic through Social Distancing (2020)
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