Information Markets and Nonmarkets
Dirk Bergemann () and
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Marco Ottaviani: Department of Economics, Bocconi University
No 2296, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
As large amounts of data become available and can be communicated more easily and processed more eÂ¤ectively, information has come to play a central role for economic activity and welfare in our age. This essay overviews contributions to the industrial organization of information markets and nonmarkets, while attempting to maintain a balance between foundational frameworks and more recent developments. We start by reviewing mechanism-design approaches to modeling the trade of information. We then cover ratings, predictions, and recommender systems. We turn to forecasting contests, prediction markets, and other institutions designed for collecting and aggregating information from decentralized participants. Finally, we discuss science as a prototypical information nonmarket with participants who interact in a non-anonymous way to produce and disseminate information. We aim to make the reader familiar with the central notions and insights in this burgeoning literature and also point to some open critical questions that future research will have to address.
Keywords: Information; Data; Data Intermediaries; Information Markets; Information Non-markets; Science (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D84 G14 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 105 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ict, nep-isf, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Published in Handbook of Industrial Organization (December 2021), Vol. 4: 2-80
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Working Paper: Information Markets and Nonmarkets (2021)
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