Experimental Persuasion

Ian Ball and José-Antonio Espín-Sánchez
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Ian Ball: Department of Economics, MIT

No 2298, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to perform from a feasible set of experiments. Receiver observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. We characterize optimal persuasion in this baseline regime and in an alternative regime in which Sender can commit to garble the outcome of the experiment. Our model includes Bayesian persuasion as the special case in which every experiment is feasible; however, our analysis does not require concavification. Since we focus on experiments rather than beliefs, we can accommodate general preferences including costly experiments and non-Bayesian inference.

Keywords: Experiments; Beliefs; Decision Making; Information; Bayesian (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2021-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-isf, nep-mic and nep-ore
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