Affective Interdependence and Welfare

Aviad Heifetz, Enrico Minelli and Herakles Polemarchakis
Additional contact information
Aviad Heifetz: Open University of Israel
Enrico Minelli: University of Brescia
Herakles Polemarchakis: University of Warwick

No 2360R1, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Purely affective interaction allows the welfare of an individual to depend on her own actions and on the profile of welfare levels of others. Under an assumption on the structure of mutual affection that we interpret as "non-explosive mutual affection," we show that equilibria of simultaneous-move affective interaction are Pareto optimal independently of whether or not an induced standard game exists. Moreover, if purely affective interaction induces a standard game, then an equilibrium profile of actions is a Nash equilibrium of the game, and this Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal profile of strategies is locally dominant.

Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2026-01-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2026-02/d2360r1.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2360r1

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().