Information Revelation in Constant-Sum Games: Elections and Beyond

Navin Kartik, Francesco Squintani and Katrin Tinn
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Navin Kartik: Yale University, Department of Economics
Francesco Squintani: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Katrin Tinn: McGill University, Desautels Faculty of Management

No 2484, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which office-motivated candidates possess private information about policy consequences. The ex-post property implies a sharp bound on information aggregation: equilibrium voter welfare is at best equal to the efficient use of a single candidate's information. In canonical specifications, politicians may "anti-pander" (overreact to their information), whereas some degree of pandering would be socially beneficial. We discuss other applications of the ex-post result.

Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2025-12-19
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