Logrolling and Budget Allocation Games
Martin Shubik and
Ludo Van der Heyden
No 445, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
In this paper we approach the concept of logrolling by examining a voting system where choices are made among sets of competing projects as a game in characteristic function form. We translate the question: "Will there be prices for votes on different projects which clear the market?" into a different, but equivalent question: "Is the formal game we have described a market game?" We show that in general the answer is no, unless all voters have virtually the same preferences.
Note: CFP 482.
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Published in International Journal of Game Theory (1978), 7(3/4): 151-162
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:445
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