Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Robert J. Webber
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Robert J. Webber: Northwestern University

No 531, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: The auction of an object is considered, for the case in which one bidder is better-informed than the others concerning the actual value of the object. An equilibrium point solution of the competitive bidding game is determined; at this equilibrium, the expected revenue of the less-well-informed bidders is zero. The case of an object which can take only values from a discrete set is dealt with as the limit of auctions of continuously-valued objects.

Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1979-08
Note: CFP 576b.
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (1983), 11: 161-169

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