The Central Assignment Game and the Assignment Markets

Mamoru Kaneko ()

No 563, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Initially we prove the nonemptiness of the core of an n-person game without side payments called a central assignment game. Next, we provide a market model with indivisible goods but without the transferable utility assumption. Applying the first result to the market model, we prove the nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we provide a generalization of the market model and also show the nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium using the results in the previous model.

Pages: 38 pages
Date: 1980-10
Note: CFP 551.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (1982), 10: 205-232

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