A Path Following Procedure for Finding a Point in the Core of a Balanced N-Person Game

Ludo Van der Heyden

No 575, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: A basic theorem in n-person game theory due to Scarf states that a balanced game has a nonempty core. Scarf's proof presents a procedure to find a point in the core of a discrete game, where every coalition disposes of a finite number of alternatives. The proof for a general game follows by passing to the limit. In this paper we present a procedure which works with the characteristic sets in original form. They no longer need to be approximated. The procedure consists in following a finite sequence of possibly nonlinear paths. The framework adopted for this paper is more general than needed to treat the core problem. This enables us to present a unified approach treating the latter problem as well as related problems in linear complementarity theory and fixed point computation.

Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1980-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d05/d0575.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:575

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().