Duopoly with Differentiated Products and Entry Barriers

Kofi O. Nti and Martin Shubik

No 576, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Product differentiated duopoly with a potential entrant facing a single period fixed cost entry barriers is modeled as a noncooperative game. In addition to characterizing the equilibrium solutions and relating them to entry costs and product differentiation, a comparison of price and quantity competition shows that entry conditions are qualitatively sensitive to the strategic variables used in a given industry. Quantity competition appears to be more favorable for entry than price competition. The use of threats and other exclusionary tactics, such as limit pricing, decisively determine the outcome when entry costs are moderate.

Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1981-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Southern Economic Journal (1981), 48(1): 179-186

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