Equilibria of a Two-Person Non-Zero Sum Noisy Game of Timing

Carolyn Pitchik

No 579, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of an equilibrium point (as well as for the existence of a dominating equilibrium point) in a two-person non-zero sum game of timing.

Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1981-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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