The Conventionally Stable Sets in Noncooperative Games with Limited Observations: Definitions and Introductory Arguments

Mamoru Kaneko ()

No 601, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper attempts to define a new solution concept for n-person noncooperative games. The idea of the new concept is based on that of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, or more precisely, rather on their interpretation of it which they call "standards of behavior." This new approach enables us to consider new interesting problems of information. Further this approach gives us a plausible interpretation of Nash equilibrium. This paper provides the definition and considers the new solution concept for zero-sum two-person games, the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of sexes and games with a continuum of players.

Pages: 53 pages
Date: 1981-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (April 1987), 13(2): 93-128

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Journal Article: The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments (1987)
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