Some Remarks on the Folk Theorem in Game Theory

Mamoru Kaneko ()

No 607, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1981-10
Note: CFP 562.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (1982), 3: 281-290

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d06/d0607.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Journal Article: Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory (1982)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:607

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().