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A Note on Enough Money in a Strategic Market Game with Complete or Fewer Markets

Martin Shubik

No 730, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper discusses the notion of "enough money" in strategic market games. In an economy with one money, m-1 markets and no credit, in order to be able to achieve efficient trade there must be "enough money" held by all traders. In essence "enough money" means that the noncooperative equilibrium solutions to a strategic market game is interior, in other words it is not considered by lack of liquidity. For simplicity two specific market mechanisms are described to illustrate the relationship between market structure and liquidity.

Keywords: Enough money in trade; price system; market structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 1984-11
Note: CFP 632.
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Published in Economics Letters (1985), 19: 231-235

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