Games with Perceptive Commanders But Less Perceptive Subordinates

Martin Shubik

No 733, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We introduce a model of the 2 x 2 games played by agents or subordinates of the players. We assume that each agent or subordinates of the players. We assume that each agent is not as perceptive as his commander in that he can make only two distinctions among the four outcomes whose value can be distinguished by the commanders.

Keywords: Game theory; agents; commanders; subordinates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 1984-12
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