The Use of Simple Games to Illustrate Concepts and to Provide Experimental Evidence

Martin Shubik

No 744, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper is devoted to a discussion of several simple experimental games used in a series of lectures on game theory. The prime purpose of these games was to raise questions and illustrate problems in the construction of game theoretical models in the social sciences. The students were asked to make choices or to give opinions as to what imputation should be recommended as a solution in a cooperative game.

Keywords: Game theory; cooperative game solutions; strategic form; extensive form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 1985-05
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